Cultivating your Child Witness

Introduction

            According to Florida law, a party is not liable in tort for an injury when some separate third-party force or action actively intervenes to cause damage.  In the case at bar, TAMMY ELLISON (“Ellison” or “T. Ellison”), an adult student attending trade classes at the POLK COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD (“School Board” or “Board”) Ridge Career Center campus, suffered personal injury after she sat in a damaged office chair (the “Chair”) placed at her desk by fellow student JONATHAN HEROY (“Heroy”).  Ellison’s husband KENTON MARK ELLISON (“K.M. Ellison”) and children ERIC CHAPMAN (“Chapman”) and LINDA YATES (“Yates”)(together with Ellison, the “Ellison Family”) each claim loss of consortium from Ellison’s Chair accident.  Because (a) Heroy was the active and efficient cause of Ellison’s injuries and (b) the School Board was not legally aware of the Chair or its condition, this Court should enter is order awarding the School Board final summary judgment on all counts of the Ellison Family’s Corrected Amended Complaint.

Background & Statement of Undisputed Facts

            Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and her version of events[1], these are the undisputed facts of the case:

            In October 2010, Ellison, an adult vocational student, enrolled in a medical transcription “coding” class offered by the School Board at its Ridge Career Center campus.  Tr. of Depo. of T. Ellison at 6, 34, 43.  In early 2011, Heroy, a heavy-set 500-600 pound man and fellow adult vocational student, joined Ellison’s class.  See Tr. of Depo. of J. Heroy at 5, 11-12, 14, 16.  Heroy, like Ellison and the other students in coding class, was assigned a workstation at school, consisting of workspace on a long shared table, a computer and an office chair.  Tr. of Depo of T. Ellison at 45, 61-62; Tr. of Depo. of J. Heroy at 15, 17.  Assigned seating for the coding class never varied; even though the coding classroom was used for night classes, Ellison regularly – since “the beginning of class” – left her “camouflage light fleece jacket” on the back of the office chair at her assigned workspace.  Tr. of Depo. of T. Ellison at 45, 66, 68.

            At some point in class during the week before the incident, Heroy broke the lift system on the School Board-owned office chair at his assigned workspace.  Tr. of Depo. of T. Ellison at 78.  The “Chair,” though internally damaged, was not visibly broken – when Heroy would sit in the Chair, “it would go straight down,” but when Heroy stood from the Chair, “it would go back up.”  Id. at 21; See Tr. of Depo. of T. Ellison at 84 (“All the chairs looked the same ….”)  Heroy never told anyone at school about breaking the Chair and chose instead to leave it at his assigned space since it “still functioned.”  Tr. of Depo. of J. Heroy at 23, 27.               

On the morning of April 18, 2011, Ellison arrived at the School Board’s Ridge campus, “clocked in” for coding class, went to her assigned workstation, found her camouflage light fleece jacket on the back of the Chair, pulled the Chair out from under the table, sat down, and “slammed into” its “base.”  Tr. of Dep. of T. Ellison at 65-66, 68-69; See Corr. Am. Complaint at ¶¶ 6-7.  Per Ellison, the Chair at her workstation “did not hold;” its “hydraulic [system] did not stop” it “where it was supposed to.”  Tr. of Dep. of T. Ellison at 69.  This incident forms the basis of Ellison’s action against the School Board.  See Corr. Am. Complaint at ¶¶ 7, 9-10.   

In Ellison’s words, shortly after she sat down in the Chair, and slammed into its base, Heroy approached her and admitted his direct involvement in her accident:

Q:        Do you recall any conversations that ensued in the following minutes?

A:        Jonathan spoke up and says I broke my chair and I switched it out with yours and I meant to tell you.

Q:        Okay.  So that occurred within how long after the accident?

A:        Right after I was – Linda helped me up.

Q:        Okay.  So just so I’m clear, he told you, I broke my chair?

A:        Yes.

Q:        I switched it out with yours.

A:        Yes.

Q:        I meant to tell you.

A:        Yes.

Tr. of Depo. of T. Ellison at 74.  Further:

Q:        Do you have any understanding as to when the chair allegedly broke?  Did Jonathan tell you anything or did you come to find out anything as far as when that occurred in relation to this incident?

A:        All he said is he broke his chair while I was gone and he switched it out with mine. 

Tr. of Depo. of T. Ellison at 77.         

Analysis & Argument

            The School Board is not liable to the Ellison Family, and thus should be awarded summary judgment, because:

            (a)        despite the Corrected Amended Complaint’s allegations to the contrary, the negligent act of Jonathan Heroy is both the actual cause and a legally intervening cause of the Ellison Family’s damages;

            (b)        there is no evidence to suggest or infer that the School Board had any knowledge that the Chair was dangerous or that the Chair’s operational deficiency existed longer than a reasonable period of time between inspections; and

            (c)        in the absence of School Board negligence, the Ellison Family cannot recover on its derivative consortium claims.

I.          Legal Standards

            A.         Summary Judgment, Generally

“The Florida standard for summary judgment is well entrenched.”  Competelli v. City of Bellair Bluffs, 113 So. 3d 92, 93 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).  “A movant is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials as would be admissible in evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Estate of Githens ex rel. Seaman v. Bon Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 928 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)(quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c))(internal quotation marks removed)(emphasis added).  “The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to allow the trial court to look beyond the confines of the pleadings … to determine whether there are issues of material fact that require resolution by the trier of fact.”  Boyle v. Hernando Beach South Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 38 Fla. L. Weekly D2073 (Fla. 5th DCA Sep. 27, 2013).  “If there are none and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the court may resolve the claim without the necessity of a costly and time consuming trial.”  Id. (citing Gabriel v. Disney Cruise Line, 93 So. 3d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); National Airlines, Inc. v. Florida Equip. Co. of Miami, 71 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1954) (“The function of the rule authorizing summary judgments is to avoid the expense and delay of trials when all facts are admitted or when a party is unable to support by any competent evidence a contention of fact.”)).      

In essence, “a party moving for summary judgment must show conclusively the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.” Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1985).  “If the court determines that the movant has met its initial burden,” and is otherwise legally entitled to judgment in its favor, “the non-moving party then bears the burden of showing that there are issues of material fact that exist and that the movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Boyle at 2 (citing Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966); Bryson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 75 So. 3d 783, 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)).

While the question of “whether a defendant exercised reasonable care under a given set of facts is generally an issue for the jury to decide” in negligence cases, it becomes a “question[] of law if the facts point to but one possible conclusion.”  Menendez v. West Gables Rehab. Hosp., LLC, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D2004 (Fla. 3d DCA Sep. 18, 2013)(internal quotations and citations removed)(emphasis added); See Dampier v. Morgan Tire & Auto, LLC, 82 So. 3d 204, 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).  In particular, a party “is not liable for damages suffered by an injured party when some separate force or action is the active and efficient intervening cause of the injury.”  Goldberg v. Florida Power & Light Co., 899 So. 2d 1105, 1116 (Fla. 2005).  “Florida courts have held that proximate cause can be determined as a matter of law, and summary judgment is appropriate, when the undisputed record reveals such an intervening cause.”  Mendendez, supra (citing Ruiz v. Westbrooke Lake Homes, Inc., 559 So. 2d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)). 

B.         Res Ipsa Loquitur

This is not a case where the evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.

As we all know, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely a rule of evidence. Under it an inference may arise in aid of the proof. Establishment of the facts that the instrument causing the injury was in the sole control of the defendant, [and] that the occurrence would not have happened in the ordinary course of events had there been proper care on the defendant's part, provides evidence that the injury sprang from the defendant's negligence.

Empire Club, Inc. v. Hernandez, 974 So. 2d 447, 448-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)(citing Yarborugh v. Ball U-Drive Sys., Inc., 48 So. 2d 82, 83-84 (Fla. 1950)).  It is a “doctrine of extremely limited applicability” that “only applies where direct proof of negligence is wanting or unavailable.”  Monfori v. K-Mart, Inc., 690 So. 2d 631, 633 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).

Anticipating that Ellison may attempt to avoid summary judgment by arguing res ipsa loquitur vis-à-vis the Chair, the School Board submits that Ellison cannot show, based on the undisputed facts before the Court in this case, that “the instrument causing the injury was in the sole control” of the School Board nor can Ellison show that her injury “would not have happened” to her “in the ordinary course of events had there been proper care on the defendant's part” as required.  Instead, quite simply, Heroy’s presence in this case and weight (between 500 and 600 pounds) presents a plausible explanation for Ellison’s injury – Heroy broke the Chair while Heroy was sitting in it under Heroy’s control.  See Modicue v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 106 So. 2d 579, 582 (La. Ct. App. 2012)(“Here, Modicue's prodigious weight” – over 400 pounds – “makes it unlikely that the only reasonable explanation for the collapse of the chair was that it contained a defect.”)